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Hong Kong University of Science & Technology, Kowloon, Hong KongSummary.— Distinct patterns of regional development have emerged in China’s political economy since the initiation of economic re-
forms in late 1970s. In particular, the localities of Suzhou, Wenzhou, and Dongguan each achieved dramatic economic growth during the
ﬁrst three decades of reform, earning them national reputations as developmental ‘‘models” for other cities in China to recognize and
emulate. However, the local states of Suzhou, Wenzhou, and Dongguan responded diﬀerentially to changing conditions in the broader
domestic and global economy; and the global ﬁnancial crisis at the end of the 2000s aﬀected the three localities with varying levels of
severity. This article thus seeks to explain why previously well-performing developmental models diverged in their performance and
capacity to recover from a major economic shock. Drawing on national economic census data, in-depth ﬁeld interviews, and relevant
secondary literature, we argue that variation in the institutional adaptability of Suzhou, Wenzhou, and Dongguan throughout the course
of their developmental experiences had a deﬁning eﬀect on how these cities fared during the ﬁnancial crisis. The process-tracing case
studies reveal that a locality’s ability to adjust to changing market conditions may be conditioned by structural endowments, but ulti-
mately hinges on agent-centric factors, including motivated and capable local leadership, openness to new policy ideas, and state capacity
for policy implementation. Ultimately, our analysis makes the broader observation that in a dynamic environment, factors that promote
economic success at one point can become barriers later on. Hence, exploring a region’s institutional adaptability and identifying the
factors that facilitate or impede such adaptability in local economic governance provides a more nuanced means for understanding a
locality’s evolving developmental patterns and performance—during normal times, as well as more challenging periods.
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June 11, 2016.1. INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1970, China’s political economy has been dis-
tinguished by its decentralized and experimental approach to
reforming socialist-era institutions (Naughton, 1995). This rel-
atively permissive policy stance facilitated the emergence of
distinct patterns of regional development. In particular, the
localities of Suzhou, Wenzhou, and Dongguan each achieved
dramatic economic growth over the ﬁrst three decades of
reform, earning them national reputations as ‘‘models” for
other cities of China to recognize and emulate (see Table 1).
Suzhou developed vibrant township and village enterprises
(TVEs), and further enhanced its competitive status through
the creation of special economic zones and high-technology
parks. Initially impoverished during the Mao era, Wenzhou’s
developmental path became known for its vibrant private sec-
tor when the political status of proﬁt-making activities was
still highly controversial (Parris, 1993; Tsai, 2006). Dongguan,
located between Hong Kong and Guangzhou, developed an
export-oriented manufacturing economy by attracting large
amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI). Until the global
ﬁnancial crisis, all three localities yielded growth rates that107were more than double the national average of 8.1% (during
1978–2004) (WSB, 2005). However, the local states of Suzhou,
Wenzhou, and Dongguan responded diﬀerentially to changing
market conditions, and the economic downturn at the end of
the 2000s aﬀected the three localities with varying levels of
severity. 1 This paper thus seeks to explain why previously
well-performing developmental models diverged in their per-
formance and capacity to recover from a major economic
shock. In so doing, it traces the reform-era developmental
paths of the three localities based on both primary and sec-
ondary sources. We also conducted ﬁeldwork by interviewing
private entrepreneurs and local oﬃcials from diﬀerent bureau-
cracies (See Appendix A).
This paper argues that variation in the institutional adapt-
ability of local governments throughout their developmental
experiences proved to be a key indicator of how well the
respective cities weathered the global ﬁnancial crisis. Existing
explanations for variation in institutional adaptability may
be divided into those that emphasize structural versus agent-
centric factors. Conventional structural variables include: (1)
natural endowments and historical legacies; (2) external
resources and opportunities; and (3) fiscal conditions. The
agent-centric variables include the following attributes of local
leadership and administration: (1) highly motivated and cap-
able leadership; (2) openness to new policy ideas; and (3) state
capacity for policy implementation. While acknowledging the
relevance of structural conditions, this study highlights the
Table 1. Developmental characteristics of Suzhou, Wenzhou, and Dongguan
Locality Period Local economy State–business relationship Central–local
relationship
Type of capital
Suzhou, Jiangsu Province 1980s Dominated by TVEs and
strong collective sector
Local state-led
macroeconomic planning
More central-
oriented
State and foreign
capital
1990s Privatization of TVEs and
attraction of FDI
Strong local state
intervention and stronger
social safety net
Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province 1980s Dominated by private
household factories
Minimal state intervention More independent
and autonomous
Mainly domestic
capital
1990s Small commodities with
more out-migration
More state intervention,
planning, and regulation
Dongguan, Guangdong Province 1980s Small-scale manufacturing Close relationship between
levels of local state and
business
More independent
and localized
Mainly overseas
Chinese capital
1990s Promotion of export-
oriented development
More centralized city-level
government
108 WORLD DEVELOPMENTrole of agent-centric factors in mediating, and even redirecting
pre-existing developmental patterns. Localities demonstrating
greater institutional adaptability tend to have ambitious lead-
ers who are well educated and have a progressive outlook
toward developmental strategies, along with the administra-
tive capacity to implement local developmental policies. Lead-
ers in such localities are also more willing to mobilize
resources from higher levels of government, and are more
likely to be promoted.
The paper proceeds as follows. The ﬁrst section situates our
analysis of local governmental adaptability in the literature on
institutional development. We argue that state capacity to
adjust to a dynamic economic environment ultimately depends
on the agency of local leaders even though structural endow-
ments may condition their policy options. The subsequent sec-
tions trace the developmental paths and patterns of
institutional adaptability in Suzhou, Wenzhou, and Dong-
guan, respectively. We then compare the factors accounting
for variation in institutional adaptability among the three
localities. Each locality established a distinct area of compar-
ative advantage at the outset of reform, which yielded impres-
sive growth rates. Over time, however, they diverged in
adaptability to changing conditions in the broader domestic
and global economy. Suzhou shifted its priorities to fostering
technology-intensive industries prior to the crisis; Wenzhou
persisted in its original economic model; and Dongguan
attempted belated reforms. We conclude with the caveat that
policies associated with growth during a particular period do
not guarantee continued success later on, as market conditions
shift during the very process of economic development.2. EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONAL ADAPTABILITY
By deﬁnition, ‘‘institutional adaptability” has a normatively
positive connotation, but what are the sources of such adapt-
ability? The late economic historian and institutionalist, Dou-
glass North (1990, 2005), noted the importance of adaptive
capacity in his explanation of developmental success, arguing
that adaptive capacity facilitated by formal and informal insti-
tutions enables actors to experiment with a broad spectrum of
options in both political and economic systems. Richardson
and Bogart (2008) depict Great Britain’s adaptability in
property-rights institutions as a response to the will of the peo-
ple in fostering economic development during 1700–1830.
From an alternative perspective, Nassim Taleb (2010) explores
the concept of adaptive governance and contends that varia-tions in innovative strength result not from systemic features,
but from the opportunities provided through ‘‘maximum
tinkering.” Such tinkering may occur in non-democracies as
long as rulers encourage openness to exploring a wide range
of plausible alternatives among its institutions, processes,
and actors.
Taleb’s insight holds particular relevance to China given
that its experimental approach to reform reconﬁgured the
country’s socialist political economy within the span of just
a few decades. During the 1970s, proﬁt-making activities were
illegal, China’s economy was closed to foreign trade and
investment, and internal migration/labor mobility was highly
restricted. By the 1990s, those key constraints to market-
oriented development had been reversed: the private sector
was legalized and thriving, China became one of the world’s
leading destinations of FDI, and hundreds of millions of rural
migrants were working in its cities. Incremental reforms gener-
ated unexpected economic transformation.
Within this national macroeconomic context of economic
liberalization, localities have exhibited remarkable diversity
in their developmental patterns and capacity for institutional
adaptation. One of the recurrent themes in studies of China’s
political economy is that the interests and policy priorities of
central and local governments are not always aligned.
Breznitz and Murphree (2011) describe this tension in
central-local relations as ‘‘structured uncertainty.” This uncer-
tainty has enabled local adaptation of ambiguous central man-
dates to build an innovation economy through ‘‘trial and error
based experimentation (p. 19).” Along similar lines, Chen
(2014) ﬁnds that the choice of global business allies by local
governments aﬀected the manner in which domestic ﬁrms pur-
sue industrial upgrading, leading to varying levels of success.
In a broader analysis of local developmental paths during
the reform era, Ang (2016) contends that industrial growth
and bureaucratic capacity has occurred in a coevolutionary,
rather than sequential manner. Furthermore, local variation
in developmental resources and trajectories exhibits a ‘‘domes-
tic ﬂying geese pattern,” whereby coastal localities that
attracted foreign direct investment earlier in the reform era,
now represent a domestic source of investment for interior
regions. Unlike Ang’s structured approach, however, this
paper advances an agent-centric perspective to explain varia-
tion in institutional adaptability, and in turn, divergent eco-
nomic performance during diﬀerent stages of development.
Beyond the literature on China’s contemporary political
economy, our emphasis on agency departs from conventional
explanations for cross-national or regional variation in devel-
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dence has generated considerable attention and reﬁnement.
Pierson (2000), for example, characterizes path dependence
as ‘‘social processes that exhibit increasing returns (p. 252).”
He emphasizes the importance of sequencing, such that
‘‘Earlier events matter more than later ones, and hence diﬀer-
ent sequences may produce diﬀerent outcomes (p. 253).” By
showing how historical and developmental legacies narrow
the choice of a region’s future developmental trajectory, path
dependency privileges a region’s structural conditions. A cog-
nate concept from evolutionary economic geography is the
phenomenon of ‘‘lock-in” (Essletzbichler & Rigby, 2007). Sim-
ilar to path dependence, it stresses the importance of past and
structural conditions that constrain future developmental
choices. Meanwhile, the varieties of capitalism (VOC) litera-
ture reinforced the concept of distinctive models of political
economy, highlighting institutional complementarities that
are mutually reinforcing (Hall & Soskice, 2001). By focusing
on the institutional mechanisms underlying continuous repro-
duction of existing systems, however, this comparative statics
approach underestimates the potential for actors to adapt old
strategies in light of altered circumstances (Streeck & Thelen,
2005). VOC similarly overlooks the possibility of what James
Mahoney (2000) calls, ‘‘path dependent reactive sequences,”
whereby ‘‘early events trigger subsequent development not
by reproducing a given pattern, but by setting in motion a
chain of tightly linked reactions and counterreactions (p.
526–527).” In reactive sequences, strong responses may
‘‘transform and perhaps reverse early events.”
While acknowledging the constraints that a region’s past can
have on its future development, this paper highlights institu-
tional adaptability as the central causal concept for explaining
regional unevenness in crisis-coping ability. The latter refers to
the ability of an economy to withstand, recover from, or adjust
to the negative eﬀects of adverse exogenous shocks (Briguglio,
Cordina, Farrugia, & Vella, 2009). Institutional adaptability is
indicated by the capacity to enact diverse responses—meaning
a variety of proactive, preemptive, and reactive operations
and procedures—that facilitate continual adjustment to and
absorption of endogenous and exogenous challenges
(Heilmann&Perry, 2011). It is in this context that we emphasize
the possibility that local agents could introduce policies that
lead a region to diverge from an apparently self-reinforcing
developmental trajectory, even before a crisis demands a policy
reaction. The likelihood of proactive reforms depends on the
availability of leaders who are highly motivated and open to
new ideas about economic development. Such leaders may be
regarded as political entrepreneurs. Sheingate (2003) notes in
the context of American politics that political entrepreneurs
‘‘engage in speculative acts of creative recombination in ways
that challenge existing boundaries of authority” (p. 202). As
entrepreneurs, they are by deﬁnition risk acceptant and inspired
to mobilize resources to support novel endeavors.
Building on this concept, we contend that in order to promote
economic development, political entrepreneurs pursue particu-
lar courses of action based on causal beliefs about the principles
and possibilities of growth. In the study of comparative political
economy, economic ideas have been characterized as ‘‘institu-
tional blueprints,” particularly during times of crisis—because
they ‘‘reduce uncertainty, give content to interests, and make
institutional construction possible (Blyth, 2001, p. 3).” The pre-
sent study suggests that economic ideas are equally relevant for
guiding policy during non-crisis periods. Adherence to pre-
existing beliefs about static formulas or models for economic
success should be distinguished from receptiveness to alterna-
tive visions of economic development.The importance of political agency and the ideational out-
look of individual leaders have been shown in some studies
of why Chinese localities with comparable endowments and
institutions have pursued vastly diﬀerent developmental strate-
gies. In a comparison of two northeastern coastal cities, Qing-
dao and Dalian, Chung (1999) found that Dalian’s leaders
were far more ‘‘open minded and reformist” in the 1980s,
and therefore more entrepreneurial in cultivating foreign eco-
nomic relations than leaders in Qingdao. 2 Similarly,
Donaldson’s (2009) comparative study of two interior pro-
vinces, Guizhou and Yunnan, found that Guizhou’s provincial
leadership deviated from central priorities by pursuing poverty
reduction policies over GDP growth. While serving as Guiz-
hou’s provincial party secretary, Hu Jintao was ‘‘motivated
by speciﬁc ideas about how the problem of rural poverty
should be addressed (p. 441).” By contrast, Yunnan’s leaders
prioritized development of its tobacco and tourism industries,
reasoning that ‘‘the choice of speciﬁc poverty reduction pro-
grams should not only satisfy the immediate demand of food
and housing for the poor, but also consider long-term and sus-
tainable development. . . and focus on proﬁt (p. 442).” These
diﬀering developmental ideas during the 1980s yielded higher
growth rates in Yunnan without much poverty reduction,
and the reverse outcome in Guizhou by the mid-1990s.
In addition to the leadership of motivated local oﬃcials and
their receptiveness to alternative economic ideas, the third
agent-centric factor that facilitates institutional adaptability
is state capacity to implement policies. Even when strong lead-
ers hold similar sets of economic ideas, they may not translate
into similar outcomes due to variation in administrative
capacity. During the late 1950s, for example, the presidents
of Argentina and Brazil, Arturo Frondizi and Juscelino
Kubitschek, respectively, shared congruent ‘‘devel
opmentalist” economic ideas about the causes of underdevel-
opment and adopted similar policy responses (Sikkink,
1991). Although both governments promoted import-
substituting industrialization, Brazil’s state-led eﬀorts yielded
growth, while administrative instability in Argentina inhibited
eﬀective implementation of developmentalist policies. Indica-
tors of state capacity include having reliable agents (civil ser-
vants), low levels of corruption, and functional monitoring
mechanisms. Besides these organizational features, the struc-
tural availability of ﬁscal revenues further enhances state
capacity. In other words, local state capacity constitutes an
agent-centric variable that is also conditioned by the structural
supply of public ﬁnance.
Returning to the overarching problematic of institutional
adaptability, our argument may be summarized as follows
(see Figure 1). In any given locality, structural factors—natu-
ral resource endowments and historical legacy, external
resources, fiscal conditions—both constrain and provide diﬀer-
ent developmental options. Yet institutional adaptability can-
not be read oﬀ deterministically from structural context
because agent-centric variables—leadership, ideas, and state
capacity—ultimately determine the manner in which local
resources are deployed. To borrow the title of an inﬂuential
article in political economy, ‘‘Structures do not come with
an instruction sheet (Blyth, 2003).” Political entrepreneurs
may seek to mobilize external resources. Leaders insulated
from alternative ideas about the economy may not recognize
the potential value of certain endowments. Complacent cadres
may squander resources. Structural conditions are necessarily
mediated by the vision and capabilities of local leaders and
governing institutions.
With this context in mind, this paper compares Suzhou,
Wenzhou, and Dongguan to explain variation in the adaptive
Figure 1. Factors contributing to variation in institutional adaptability. Note: The dotted line connecting Fiscal Conditions and State Capacity is meant to
indicate that the structural supply of public finance has implications for local state capacity. Other indicators of local state capacity include the presence of
reliable agents, low levels of corruption, and functional monitoring mechanisms.
110 WORLD DEVELOPMENTcapacity of their respective local states during the global ﬁnan-
cial crisis. We propose that strong adaptive governance is
required for a state to introduce policies that match its chang-
ing economic circumstances at appropriate turning points—
prior to shocks that force the issue. Both a city’s economic
mode and type of local governance are dynamic, and thus able
to change in response to exogenous and endogenous chal-
lenges. Whether the local state pursues policies that are appro-
priate to its economic situation at diﬀerent stages of
development indicates the strength of its adaptive governance.
The patterns of institutional adaptability in the three cities
may be described as proactive (Suzhou), delayed (Dongguan),
and reactive (Wenzhou). Proactive adaptive governance means
actively adjusting to changing economic situations at appro-
priate turning points. Delayed adaptive governance refers to
adjusting in a constructive direction but only after the appro-
priate turning point. Reactive adaptive governance demon-
strates passive adaptation to dynamic economic situations
with inappropriate and poorly timed interventions. We then
analyze how and why each of the three local states adopted
diﬀerent policies in response to the continuously changing eco-
nomic environment, and assess the institutional adaptability
of their local states in response to external challenges.3. VARIATION IN ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND
CRISIS-COPING ABILITY
Although the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2008–09 aﬀected the
entire Chinese economy, its impact varied regionally, as seen
in Suzhou, Wenzhou, and Dongguan. The variation in their
economic performance and crisis-coping ability is apparent
in the pre- and post-crisis performance of ﬁve economic indi-
cators: GDP per capita, gross value of industrial output, totalinvestment in ﬁxed assets, total utilized foreign capital, and
total patent authorizations. (See Table 2 for a summary of
the basic economic conditions of Suzhou, Wenzhou, and
Dongguan from 1979 to 2010, and Table 3 for the number
of patents.)
The following ﬁgures illustrate the impact of the economic cri-
sis on the three local states, as indicators of their ability to with-
stand and recover from the eﬀect of the exogenous shock.
As shown in Figure 2, all three cities experienced decreases
in the growth rate of per capita GDP during 2008, and all
three started to recover after 2009. Dongguan experienced a
greater drop than Wenzhou during 2008–09, and Suzhou suf-
fered the least. Growth in per capita GDP subsequently
rebounded during 2009–10 to 18.5% in Suzhou, 14.6% in
Wenzhou, and 7.8% in Dongguan.
Figure 3 shows that the growth rate of gross value of indus-
trial output (GVIO) declined in all three cities during the
ﬁnancial crisis, and all three started to recover after 2009.
Dongguan suﬀered the greatest drop in GVIO growth, and
again, Suzhou performed best of the three.
Figure 4 reveals that Suzhou experienced the least volatility
in total ﬁxed asset investment among the three cities. Follow-
ing a slight drop during 2007–08, investment in Suzhou started
to recover. Wenzhou suﬀered most during 2007–08 and recov-
ered during 2008–09 to a level slightly lower than before the
crisis. Dongguan experienced a smaller decrease than Wen-
zhou and had a similar recovery during 2008–09. Dongguan’s
reduced growth rate during 2009–10 was due to reduction in
industrial expansion and relocation of some industries to
places such as Kunshan (in the southeast Jiangsu Province,
adjacent to Shanghai municipality) with more favorable busi-
ness environments.
Figure 5 indicates that Suzhou maintained stable growth
in total utilized foreign capital both before and after the
Table 2. Social and economic conditions in Suzhou, Wenzhou, and Dongguan, 1979–2010
Year GDP per capita (yuan) Gross industrial output value
(billion yuan)
Total foreign capital used
(million USD)
Total investment in ﬁxed assets
(one hundred million yuan)
Suzhou Wenzhou Dongguan Suzhou Wenzhou Dongguan Suzhou Wenzhou Dongguan Suzhou Wenzhou Dongguan
1979 9.0% 11.3% 7.2% 16.3% 18.2% 16.7% n/a n/a n/a n/a 75.0% 0.0%
1980 13.9% 17.7% 8.4% 29.8% 30.8% 20.4% n/a n/a 447.1% n/a 400.0% 0.0%
1981 6.6% 4.8% 24.7% 8.1% 0.0% 16.9% n/a n/a 41.9% n/a 17.1% 100.0%
1982 7.5% 9.5% 23.6% 2.5% 5.9% 20.3% n/a n/a 33.3% 11.4% 22.0% 350.0%
1983 9.6% 12.0% 12.5% 13.4% 16.7% 14.5% n/a n/a 25.0% 18.4% 21.9% 0.0%
1984 29.4% 22.2% 21.1% 33.3% 38.1% 15.8% n/a n/a 113.3% 44.8% 30.8% 66.7%
1985 33.9% 23.5% 39.6% 52.4% 44.8% 54.5% n/a n/a 50.5% 76.8% 51.0% 136.7%
1986 12.9% 17.4% 30.6% 22.8% 16.7% 41.2% 31.8% 900.0% 5.2% 16.5% 37.7% 62.0%
1987 20.8% 21.0% 28.8% 31.0% 26.5% 54.2% 313.5% 233.3% 270.4% 34.4% 19.8% 23.5%
1988 28.7% 24.2% 39.1% 41.8% 30.6% 67.6% 18.7% 0.0% 114.3% 45.2% 36.2% 16.2%
1989 5.7% 4.0% 8.2% 17.4% 11.1% 25.8% 0.4% 470.0% 3.4% 18.7% 2.9% 69.7%
1990 13.7% 5.8% 29.5% 11.5% 5.6% 26.9% 0.0% 56.1% 2.5% 0.9% 4.8% 50.0%
1991 15.5% 18.1% 17.5% 17.0% 29.5% 29.3% 70.6% 208.0% 7.5% 37.7% 13.6% 82.7%
1992 52.2% 35.3% 1.1% 74.7% 48.8% 46.1% 624.9% 223.4% 78.2% 102.4% 41.5% 38.0%
1993 45.6% 53.1% 16.1% 54.6% 87.4% 43.3% 75.5% 130.5% 100.5% 76.1% 110.6% 73.5%
1994 36.5% 49.4% 8.7% 34.7% 53.6% 45.1% 45.2% 6.6% 12.2% 13.2% 53.4% 329.3%
1995 24.9% 34.6% 16.7% 18.3% 36.4% 34.2% 6.2% 20.1% 0.8% 8.6% 40.9% 55.2%
1996 10.7% 25.2% 13.8% 15.9% 39.6% 29.5% 3.0% 7.5% 1.8% 13.9% 21.9% 7.1%
1997 12.8% 17.8% 15.4% 6.5% 23.7% 18.2% 8.4% 23.7% 12.9% 6.5% 13.4% 2.5%
1998 10.2% 10.6% 15.6% 8.0% 11.5% 23.7% 25.5% 38.6% 10.2% 11.1% 13.0% 16.8%
1999 8.6% 7.5% 10.9% 14.9% 12.3% 25.7% 6.0% 51.9% 8.9% 5.6% 16.7% 14.7%
2000 13.1% 11.3% 9.5% 20.5% 16.2% 22.4% 0.1% 28.1% 13.0% 8.7% 13.0% 16.5%
2001 13.8% 11.1% 11.6% 12.6% 11.0% 21.5% 4.8% 23.5% 10.2% 9.4% 23.9% 22.0%
2002 17.6% 13.6% 18.8% 26.1% 13.4% 24.3% 59.3% 45.6% 18.3% 43.9% 17.9% 52.7%
2003 33.5% 14.9% 22.3% 36.4% 17.7% 25.2% 41.4% 49.3% 19.3% 73.3% 15.7% 66.7%
2004 21.6% 14.0% 24.3% 36.4% 12.1% 28.1% 26.0% 74.8% 18.4% 10.4% 13.1% 42.4%
2005 18.3% 13.9% 20.8% 26.8% 18.1% 21.3% 1.6% 70.7% 23.6% 20.3% 6.9% 31.3%
2006 16.8% 14.1% 17.7% 26.3% 16.7% 23.7% 19.3% 29.6% 15.6% 12.7% 19.1% 18.1%
2007 17.7% 16.4% 15.0% 24.4% 19.7% 20.6% 17.4% 33.5% 16.3% 12.3% 14.2% 19.2%
2008 19.7% 11.0% 12.0% 16.0% 7.4% 9.7% 13.5% 57.6% 36.0% 10.3% 2.9% 12.3%
2009 8.6% 4.0% 2.9% 7.2% 1.1% 7.5% 1.2% 10.4% 8.8% 13.6% 10.5% 15.9%
2010 18.5% 14.6% 7.8% 20.2% 21.2% 14.4% 3.8% 25.1% 7.5% 21.9% 10.5% 1.9%
Sources: SSB (1993, 1994, 1998, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2015); DSB (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2014); WSB (2005, 2006,
2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011).
Table 3. Total Number of Patent Authorizations in Suzhou, Wenzhou, and Dongguan
Year Suzhou Wenzhou Dongguan
2000 1,922 n/a 1,399
2001 1,749 n/a 1,753
2002 2,324 n/a 2,680
2003 2,593 n/a 2,858
2004 2,783 n/a 3,167
2005 3,315 3,116 3,114
2006 4,855 3,816 4,872
2007 9,157 5,309 6,752
2008 18,270 5,159 8,093
2009 39,288 7,214 12,918
2010 46,109 10,554 20,397
Sources: SSB (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2015); DSB (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2014); WSB (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009,
2010, 2011).
INSTITUTIONAL ADAPTABILITY IN CHINA 111ﬁnancial crisis, with only a slight dip during 2008–09. By
contrast, Wenzhou experienced the largest decline during
2007–08. Although Wenzhou started to recover after
2008, foreign capital utilization did not return to pre-
crisis levels. The growth rate in total foreign capital
utilization continued to decline during 2009–10 due to lim-
ited foreign investment in Wenzhou. Dongguan was alsonegatively aﬀected by the crisis during 2007–08, but to a
lesser extent than Wenzhou, and recovered better than
Wenzhou.
Figure 6 shows that Suzhou experienced greater growth in
patent authorizations than the other two cities during 2007–
09, while Dongguan withstood the ﬁnancial shock slightly bet-
ter than Wenzhou.
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Figure 2. Growth Rate of per capita GDP (2004–10). Sources: WSB (2005–11); DSB (2005–11); SSB (2005–11).
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Figure 4. Growth rate of total fixed asset investment (2004–10). Sources: WSB (2005–11); DSB (2005–11); SSB (2005–11).
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Figure 3. Growth rate of gross industrial output value (2004–10). Sources: WSB (2005–11); DSB (2005–11); SSB (2005–11).
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Figure 5. Growth in total amount of utilized foreign capital (2004–2010). Sources: WSB (2005–11); DSB (2005–11); SSB (2005–11).
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INSTITUTIONAL ADAPTABILITY IN CHINA 113Overall, Suzhou demonstrated the most resilience in with-
standing the eﬀects of the economic crisis, and also recovered
most robustly among the three cities. Although Wenzhou and
Dongguan achieved extraordinary economic growth during
the ﬁrst two decades of reform, they experienced diﬀerent
degrees of decline as measured by diﬀerent indicators. Overall,
both coped poorly under crisis.4. SUZHOU
(a) Suzhou’s Developmental Path
Located in the lower Yangtze valley in southeast Jiangsu
province with a population of 10,469,000 (SSB, 2010), Suzhou
has historically been a political and economic center connected
to thousands of small towns in the region through transporta-
tion networks (Johnston, 1993). During the socialist era
(1949–77), Suzhou’s industrial development was deemphasized
due to its coastal location (Wei, Yuqi, & Chen, 2009). Never-
theless, it developed productive light industries such as hand-
icrafts and textiles (SZ815102014). Suzhou silk is known
nationally and internationally as some of the best in the world,
and contributed substantially to China’s exports at later stages(SZ815102014). During the early and mid-1950s, many small
private enterprises in Suzhou were transformed into collec-
tively owned enterprises (Yeung, 2013). By the end of the dec-
ade, communal enterprises focused on handicrafts were
ﬂourishing (Wei et al., 2009). Small-scale TVEs proliferated
in the early 1970s, when Suzhou took part in China’s second
wave of rural industrialization (Ngo, 2011). The establishment
of TVEs was facilitated by the human capital, business net-
works, technical expertise, and technology transfer provided
by urban youth who relocated from Shanghai to Suzhou
(Wei et al., 2009). By the 1980s, rural TVEs were outperform-
ing urban SOEs (SZ313102014; Ngo, 2011), providing up to
48.8% of Suzhou’s industrial output by 1985, and one-third
of provincial exports by the late 1980s (Wei et al., 2009).
Aggravated by rising domestic competition, however, TVEs
became less proﬁtable: their net proﬁt from sales dropped
from 18.1% in 1980 to 7.2% in 1985 (Wu & Jiang, 2010). In
response, Suzhou launched radical reforms to clarify property
rights by transforming various ﬁrms into private and joint
ownership enterprises (SZ915102014; Qian & Wu, 2000). As
in other cities, Suzhou faced the burden of ineﬃcient SOEs
(SZ915102014). At the end of 2000, the local government
introduced a second round of ﬁrm transformation that
allowed local governments to stop running businesses and
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(Wu & Jiang, 2010).
Suzhou’s performance in FDI was initially lower than that
of the original four special economic zones (1980) and 14
coastal cities (1984) that were opened to FDI
(SZ1124062014). Suzhou started to attract FDI in 1985, when
the local government adopted a new development strategy,
subsequently approved by the State Council in 1986
(SZ1124062014). This ‘‘Western Development” strategy aimed
to establish the Suzhou New District (SND) on the west side
of Suzhou city to preserve the old city, while providing more
space for new development (SZ915102014). The SND was
intended to be a sizeable, comprehensive, and relatively inde-
pendent new district of economic development through the
attraction of foreign trade, technological innovation, and
domestic and international talent (SZ915102014). Nonethe-
less, throughout the late 1980s, Suzhou remained short of
FDI, which comprised of mainly international loans and joint
management (Ngo, 2011).
A turning point that marked Suzhou’s commencement as a
foreign capital-led developmental model was the creation of a
joint Sino–Singapore venture in the east of Suzhou
(SZ615102014). The Suzhou Industrial Park (SIP) project
brought a 150-fold increase in FDI to the region from 1990
to 2005 (Wei, 2002). Vice-Premier Li Lanqing and Singapore’s
Lee Kuan Yew signed an agreement to establish the China-
Singapore SIP Development Corporation (CSSD), with Singa-
pore holding control with 65% and China holding 35% (Yeoh
& Cai, 2003). SIP was formed with the clear objective of trans-
ferring knowledge, whereby ‘‘Singapore would share its
knowledge of eﬃcient economic management and public
administration experience with its Chinese partner so that
the latter could formulate pro-business policies in SIP and
govern with transparency and eﬃciency” (Inkpen & Pien,
2006).
Besides its eﬀorts to attract FDI, the Suzhou government
foresaw the importance of developing technology and attract-
ing talent (SZ1024062014). An example is the creation of
Higher Education Town (HET), which was designed to estab-
lish higher educational institutions and research institutes to
connect local industries and research (SZ1024062014). By
2006, HET had already attracted 16 top universities in China
and broadened its aims to get renowned overseas universities
to set up research institutes in the SIP (Cao, 2014). The local
state also adopted policies to create a favorable environment
for people to work and live in Suzhou.
(b) Suzhou’s strong institutional adaptability
Suzhou not only performed well during favorable eco-
nomic times, but also demonstrated strong crisis-coping abil-
ity and resilience during the 2008–09 global ﬁnancial crisis.
Compared with Wenzhou and Dongguan, Suzhou was the
least aﬀected and recovered the fastest economically. The
key factor underlying Suzhou’s success was the local state’s
strong institutional adaptability throughout its developmen-
tal experience, which we describe as proactive adaptive gover-
nance.
For decades, Suzhou functioned as a local developmental
state, that is, one in which ‘‘the state gives overriding priority
to the objective of rapid economic growth and adopts policies
which are successful in achieving that objective” (Knight,
2014). The proliferation of TVEs that ultimately led to the cre-
ation of the Suzhou model was achieved with step-by-stepguidance from the local state (Oi, 1992). Suzhou’s develop-
ment of communal enterprises during the 1970s established a
foundation for the development of TVEs in the subsequent
decade. With rising competition in the domestic market, com-
bined with the revelation of systematic problems with TVEs,
Suzhou’s local state recognized this dynamic market trend
by making an eﬀort to attract FDI starting in 1985, and
restructuring TVEs in the mid-1990s. After Deng Xiaoping’s
1992 tour of southern provinces—which signaled the political
acceptability of deepening economic reforms—Suzhou’s TVEs
were all converted into joint ventures within three months
(Zweig, 2002). With the establishment of the Suzhou New Dis-
trict and the Suzhou Industrial Park, it successfully attracted
large amounts of FDI and built a well-established hardware
infrastructure system. As a local developmental state, it oﬀered
more favorable policies to large companies, state-owned com-
panies, and enterprises with foreign investment. In fact, Suz-
hou deliberately impeded the development of private
enterprise during the early 1980s to protect the development
of its TVEs (Zhang, 2007).
Suzhou embraced a local developmental state model early in
the reform era and as new opportunities arose, continued
employing developmental state strategies to promote eco-
nomic growth. As a higher ranked city, Suzhou has had a
closer relationship with the central government than locali-
ties such as Wenzhou. One interviewee commented: ‘‘We
have always followed Beijing’s footsteps” (SZ113102014).
There is debate about whether the Suzhou government’s
eﬀective performance as a local developmental state was
self-motivated or merely a result of complying with Beijing’s
mandates (SZ514102014). The above policies indeed tracked
Beijing’s, but Suzhou itself recognized the importance of
implementing these policies concretely, such as by restructur-
ing the TVEs and developing their own innovations at
opportune moments, rather than just passively executing Bei-
jing’s instructions. Moreover, Suzhou actively strove to
attract central government resources and opportunities. For
instance, when the Taihu Summit was to be held in Wuxi
(a city in Jiangsu province), Suzhou tried to win the right
to host the summit to increase Suzhou’s reputation and
attractiveness to returnee entrepreneurs (SZ414102014; Cao,
2014). Ultimately, the State Council agreed to set up the
National Thousand Talents Entrepreneurship Investment
Center in Suzhou in July 2011 before the Taihu Summit
opened in Wuxi (Cao, 2014). From the 2000s, more eﬀort
was concentrated on improving software abilities to make
Suzhou a more favorable environment for technological
upgrading, innovation, and talent cultivation. After several
years of manufacturing for multinational corporations, the
local state started to develop and nurture local innovation.
To avoid the ‘‘lock-in” trap of leaning too heavily on foreign
investment, technology, and resources, as happened in Dong-
guan, Suzhou created a distinctive path by introducing
research institutions such as the Higher Education Town
and promoting targeted new industries such as nanotechnol-
ogy to build its own solid knowledge base and sustain its
competitive advantage. Through these eﬀorts, the whole of
Suzhou became dramatically more open, innovative, and
technologically advanced. In the process, the city also
attracted substantial foreign investment, talent, and business
projects. Overall, Suzhou’s local state demonstrated capacity
to eﬀectively implement appropriate strategies at the right
transition points, creating strong institutional adaptability
in response to the 2008–09 global ﬁnancial crisis.
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(a) Wenzhou’s developmental path
Scholars tend to combine geographical, cultural, economic,
and political explanations to account for Wenzhou’s develop-
mental success since the 1980s. Located at the estuary of the
Ou River in the southeastern coast of Zhejiang province with
a population base of 8,066,000 (WSB, 2010), three-quarters of
Wenzhou territory is mountainous and rural. The limited
amount of arable land is aggravated by high population den-
sity, making subsistence agriculture a challenge (Tsai, 2006).
Culturally, Wenzhou people are known for their pragmatism
and commercial success (Zhou & Zhang, 2011). Economically,
Wenzhou was especially impoverished during the Mao era
(1949–76) when state policy not only prohibited private enter-
prise, but avoided state investment in coastal locations due to
geostrategic sensitivities (Ye & Wei, 2005). The paucity of
state investment in Wenzhou—one-seventh that of similar
cities in China—meant that Wenzhou’s economy had fewer
SOEs (Wei, Li, & Wang, 2007). Politically, unlike other parts
of China that beneﬁted from Deng Xiaoping’s reform policies
starting in 1978, Wenzhou enjoyed economic growth even
before these national reforms due to the local state’s tolerance
of semi-legal and/or illegal practices prior to the reform period
(Parris, 1993). Small private businesses already accounted for
35% of Wenzhou’s industrial output by the end of 1986 (Xie,
2000). Meanwhile, larger private ﬁrms falsely registered them-
selves as collective enterprises—a disguising strategy called
‘‘wearing a red hat”—because private enterprises employing
more than eight employees (siying qiye) were not approved
until 1988 (Tsai, 2002).
Wenzhou shifted from being a target of state suppression to
a locality of national emulation in 1983, when Wenzhou was
mentioned favorably in the People’s Daily. During the 1980s,
Wenzhou became one of China’s richest and fastest growing
urban places in terms of per capita GDP. Enterprises such
as CHINT and Delixi in Liushi Town joined the top 50 most
competitive non-state domestic brands (WZ119122014; Wei
et al., 2007). The so-called Wenzhou model of indigenously
generated petty capitalism garnered the attention of leaders
and researchers who traveled from Beijing to understand
how an isolated impoverished locality managed to develop
such a vibrant private economy. The primary components of
the Wenzhou model of the 1980s included the following: (i)
privately owned household factories were the dominant pro-
duction units; (ii) production of inexpensive consumer com-
modities based on labor-intensive manufacturing; (iii)
specialized commodity markets; (iv) extensive sales, purchas-
ing, and marketing networks throughout China; and (v) reli-
ance on a wide variety of informal ﬁnance (Tsai, 2002, 2006).
By the 1990s,Wenzhou’s family-based, low-techmanufactur-
ing model faced competition from other parts of China due to
the deepening reforms (WZ818122014). In addition, the local
state’s tolerance and protection of local businesses led to serious
quality problems (WZ219122014). For example, shoes made in
Wenzhou developed a reputation for lasting barely a week or
even a day (WZ219122014; Zhou & Tang, 2012). Therefore,
the Wenzhou government pushed for restructuring (gaizhi) to
convert the individual enterprises into shareholding coopera-
tives during the ﬁrst round of institutional restructuring, and
to limited liability corporations and conglomerates during the
second round (WZ818122014; Wei et al., 2007).
The ﬁrst round of restructuring aimed to clarify property
rights and push Wenzhou businesses up the value chain
(WZ818122014;Wei et al., 2007). The focus of the second roundof restructuring was on industrial upgrading, diversiﬁcation,
expansion, and specialization (Wei et al., 2007). Despite these
two rounds of restructuring, Wenzhou’s economy continued
its downward trend. First, there was out-migration of capital
and local businesses, as many SMEs seeking extra land to
expand production found the land in Wenzhou too scarce and
expensive (WZ502072014). From the early 1990s, business
expansion was constrained by higher production costs and
insuﬃcient land and energy in Wenzhou. Given the scarcity of
arable land in Wenzhou, many private entrepreneurs applied
for cheaper commercial land in the developmental zone, but
the application list was long and the eligibility to apply required
a business tax contribution of at least 500 thousand RMB (Liu,
2011). Many businesses thus moved production to areas with
lower costs and better resources. Second, speculative invest-
ments in real estate during the mid- to late-2000s undermined
the production-based foundation ofWenzhou’s informal credit
markets (WZ502072014). Hit by the global ﬁnancial crisis,
many Wenzhou business owners went missing or committed
suicide due to inability to pay their usurious debts
(WZ502072014). Others relocated manufacturing production
to inland provinces for lower costs, or migrated to Europe
and Africa to develop new markets (CN114132014,
YW14142014, WZ24152014).
(b) Wenzhou’s weak institutional adaptability
Wenzhou’s weak institutional adaptability over the course
of its developmental process had a deﬁning eﬀect on its expe-
rience during the 2008–09 global ﬁnancial crisis. The local
state failed to upgrade its model of comparative advantage
in light of growing domestic competition in the petty com-
modities industry and rising cost of local inputs (labor, capital,
land). Wenzhou thus represents an example of reactive adap-
tive governance.
During the 1980s, Wenzhou maintained a local liberal state
that governed the economy in a minimalist market-oriented
manner. Although the government provided some guidance,
most economic decisions were made primarily by individual
entrepreneurs (WZ1018122014). Regional bureaucrats in
Wenzhou did not directly intervene in the economy, but
rather, provided a facilitating institutional environment for
private commerce (WZ1018122014). For instance, they were
keen to facilitate the development of specialized (single-
product) markets and allowed these institutions to allocate
goods and resources independently. The local state also
allowed informal ﬁnancial intermediaries to provide ﬁrms with
key resources that were not easily accessible (Tsai, 2002; Zhou,
2009). The Wenzhou government’s liberal approach of permit-
ting individuals to make their own economic decisions suited
Wenzhou’s circumstances during that period, and led to
domestic admiration of its successful model.
When its family-based, low-tech manufacturing sector faced
challenges from other parts of China during the 1990s,
Wenzhou tried to revitalize and protect the local economy
by mimicking the practices of a local developmental state. This
eﬀort was not successful, however, due to its misalignment
with the changing pattern of Wenzhou’s economy. Increased
intervention in the economy through oversight and economic
strategizing did not meet the needs of changed market condi-
tions, revealing the local state’s weak institutional adaptabil-
ity. For example, Wenzhou launched the Second Pioneering
Initiative in 1993 to help its family enterprises upgrade,
scale-up, diversify, and expand (Tsai, 2006). Yet despite two
rounds of restructuring, Wenzhou’s enterprises remained lar-
gely under family control and dominated by small low-tech
116 WORLD DEVELOPMENTﬁrms (WZ1018122014). Moreover, inappropriate interven-
tions such as favoring large private enterprises further wors-
ened Wenzhou’s SME-dominated economy. Lacking
governmental support, local businesses either relied on infor-
mal sources of credit from private sources or migrated to cities
with more preferential policies (WZ219122014). Local leaders
lamented that once the crisis hit, they held emergency meet-
ings, ‘‘But there wasn’t much we could do. Companies had
to depend on themselves to survive the crisis. All we did was
establish platforms to connect companies with banks, so they
could get some loans (WZ818122014).” Once the national
stimulus package was launched, however, banks engaged in
reckless lending. An oﬃcial recounted that banks were com-
peting to extend large loans: ‘‘I know an entrepreneur who
received eight loans of 10 million yuan each. It all went into
real estate, so when property prices dropped, he was unable
to repay those loans (CN114132014).” Wenzhou’s ensuing
ﬁnancial crisis took local oﬃcials by complete surprise. Even
retrospectively, they do not seem to recognize that they could
have taken measures to curb risky ﬁnancial practices, such as
mutual credit guarantees among local businesses. In short,
Wenzhou’s weak adaptive capacity to support indigenous
businesses amidst increasingly competitive domestic and inter-
national markets was similarly reﬂected in its poor perfor-
mance during the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008–09.
The case of Wenzhou well illustrates our broader argument
that factors underlying economic success at one point in time
may subsequently become obstacles. For example, the geo-
graphical limitations that inspired private entrepreneurship
in the early reform period later made Wenzhou less attractive
to foreign investment and external talent that could have
helped upgrade its low-tech businesses. Similarly, the struc-
tural factors that contributed to Wenzhou’s weak institutional
adaptability might have become future strengths under diﬀer-
ent leadership and circumstances. Nonetheless, cumulative
incremental adaptations over the longer term could include
elements of ‘‘institutional conversion” (Streeck & Thelen,
2005), in which formal institutions remain intact but change
their purpose. For example, we can observe the conversion
of industrial policy from protecting markets to subsidizing
struggling ﬁrms. Since the local developmental state’s failure
during the global ﬁnancial crisis, it has adopted policies to
help struggling ﬁrms, such as legalizing private channels for
the 400,000 small local ﬁrms to obtain ﬁnance, instead of
merely protecting Wenzhou’s market by tolerating almost
any entrepreneurial behaviors as long as they are apparently
proﬁtable (WZ718122014).6. DONGGUAN
(a) Dongguan’s developmental path
Located at the center of the Shenzhen-Guangzhou economic
corridor in Guangdong province with a population base of
8,225,000 (DSB, 2010), Dongguan was one of the ﬁrst cities
to respond to the opportunities of China’s open door policy,
and soon grew into an industrial center that led to its
upgraded status in 1985 from a county to a county-level
municipality (DG629072014). Dongguan’s early economic
transformation (1978–85) was based on a strategy of ‘‘urban-
ization from below,” involving local corporatization of
state-owned companies and collectives located in townships
and villages (Airriess, 2008).
In 1985, the Dongguan government launched a ‘‘ﬁrst
industrial revolution” developmental strategy to develop anexport-oriented manufacturing economy. The combination
of industrialized processing and assembly with outward-
oriented commercial agriculture became known as the
Dongguan model (Yeung, 2001). In particular, Dongguan
pioneered a ‘‘three supplies with one compensation” (sanlai
yibu) approach to export processing (McGee, Lin, Wang,
Marton, & Jiaping, 2007), whereby foreign contractors
provided raw materials, equipment, and designs while their
Dongguan partners supplied labor, land, buildings, electricity,
and other local utilities (Smart & Lin, 2007) in return for a
processing fee (jiaogongfei) (Smart & Lin, 2007). Due to its
proximity and ethnic connections, Hong Kong initially
engaged with Dongguan in what was called a ‘‘front shop,
back factory” manufacturing process (DG228072014). A large
proportion of processing and assembly was in labor-intensive
sectors such as textiles and clothing, plastic products, and shoe
manufacturing (DG529072014; Liu & Zhen, 1992). Besides
attracting foreign companies to invest in Dongguan, the local
government also promoted export-oriented commercial agri-
culture and traditional industries to earn foreign exchange
for further investment (Yeung, 2001). Dongguan’s administra-
tive status was further upgraded to prefecture-level in 1988.
Two features of Dongguan’s economic model—its dispersed
pattern of industries and large number of migrant workers—
had a deﬁning impact on its future development in a changing
environment. Unlike Suzhou, Dongguan’s industrial develop-
ment was widely scattered among villages rather than concen-
trated in the urban center (McGee et al., 2007). Dongguan’s
mode of production did not require an urban location with
good infrastructure and a skilled workforce. Its foreign inves-
tors sought cheap labor to complete their subcontracting work
without high-tech R&D. Meanwhile, Dongguan’s migrant
population was more than three times that of its local popula-
tion (Airriess, 2008). Welfare provisions and entitlements were
polarized between local citizens and migrants because migrant
workers lacked urban household registration status (hukou) in
Dongguan (Smart & Lin, 2007). In addition, migrant workers
tended to occupy the lowest tier of the labor market
(DG930072014; Fan, 2002). A high degree of labor mobility
contributed in part to Dongguan’s later decline in growth.
Intensiﬁed competition among China’s municipalities for
FDI led Dongguan to implement the ‘‘second industrial revo-
lution” in the mid-1990s, which aimed to introduce higher-
value-added, skill-intensive, higher-tech industries (Ou-yang,
1994). Seeing Dongguan’s dispersed industrial locations as
its main shortcoming, a new project was adopted to ‘‘group
industries into parks and organize enterprises into zones”
(gongye jinyuan qiye jinqu) (DG629072014). Among the estab-
lished industrial parks, the Songshan Lake Industrial Park of
Science and Technology, which began construction in 2002,
attracted the most attention (DG629072014). This 7,200-
hectare megaproject was located in the city center and
ﬁnanced by the municipal government (Airriess, 2008). Prefer-
ential policies were oﬀered to foreign companies, including no
administrative fees and a simpliﬁed approval procedure that
could be completed within ﬁve working days (Smart & Lin,
2007). In addition to attracting more high-tech foreign compa-
nies, Dongguan tried to support local investment in select
high-tech industries by providing tax breaks, ﬁnancial assis-
tance, and human capital (Yeung, 2001).
(b) Dongguan’s delayed institutional adaptability
Although Dongguan’s developmental model diﬀers from
Wenzhou’s, it also revealed weak crisis-coping ability due to
sluggish response to a changing economic context over its
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adaptive governance type.
Dongguan initially served as a local entrepreneurial state
that governed the economy through close relationships with
local enterprises (DG1030072014). John Freeman ﬁrst deﬁned
‘‘state entrepreneurship” as a policy ‘‘through which enter-
prises are owned as public agencies but operated in accordance
with standard business criteria” (Freeman, 1982). He notes
that state entrepreneurship often depends on FDI to achieve
economic growth. Being grouped as part of the Pearl River
Delta economic development zone in 1985, Dongguan bene-
ﬁted so swiftly from export processing—mainly for Hong
Kong enterprises—that it literally paved its road toward one
of the richest areas in China. Dongguan enjoyed early interna-
tionalization thanks to its ‘‘grand trade advantages” of prox-
imity to trading partners (Womack & Zhao, 1994), based on
‘‘transnational ethnic social capital” with investors from Tai-
wan and Hong Kong (Chen, 2000), and the positive attitudes
of provincial and municipal oﬃcials toward attracting FDI
(Zweig, 2002). Cadres in Dongguan welcomed foreign capital
even when some economic planners criticized foreign capital-
ists as exploiting China’s cheap labor (Vogel, 1990). After
1978, Dongguan became known as one of the Four Little
Tigers of Guangdong Province due to its export-oriented strat-
egy. The local state sought to improve Dongguan’s competi-
tive advantage by providing a favorable environment for
foreign investment. This approach included state-appointed
factory managers, accountants, treasurers, and customs oﬃ-
cers, while foreign investors retained control over production
and daily management decisions (Yeung, 2001). To compete
for foreign investment with other Chinese regions, the Dong-
guan government also invested in a sound transportation sys-
tem. Initially, foreign companies were primarily located along
the Guangzhou-Shenzhen Highway running through the east-
ern part of Dongguan (DG328072014). To reduce transporta-
tion costs, the Dongguan government mobilized 1.74 billion
yuan to build another highway connecting Dongguan with
Shenzhen and Hong Kong (Smart & Lin, 2007), which became
the ﬁrst highway in China to be planned, funded, and con-
structed by a prefectural municipality without assistance from
the central or provincial government ((DG1030072014; Smart
& Lin, 2007).
In addition to building local infrastructure, Dongguan
improved its administrative ﬂexibility under the central gov-
ernment’s foreign investment laws (Yeung, 2001). It estab-
lished the Dongguan External P&A (processing and
assembling) Oﬃce in 1978 to centralize and simplify adminis-
trative procedures for foreign enterprises (Yeung, 2001). Rural
areas around major coastal cities were progressively interna-
tionalized during the 1980s (Zweig, 2002). Compared with
other cities in China, Dongguan has had a more decentralized
growth pattern due to the administrative absence of district or
county levels between the municipality and the city of Dong-
guan, which enhanced the importance of its towns and villages
(DG629072014). As a result, local township and village gov-
ernments participated directly in economic development and
formed close relationships with enterprises in their jurisdic-
tions (Xue & Wu, 2015). Through coalitions with foreign
enterprises and the provision of favorable conditions for for-
eign investors, especially those from Hong Kong and later Tai-
wan, Dongguan’s local state played a successful
entrepreneurial role during the ﬁrst two decades of reform.
After starting out as a local entrepreneurial state, Dongguan
transformed into a local developmental state in the 2000s.
Competition from other Chinese cities coupled with risingproduction costs pressured Dongguan to re-evaluate its poli-
cies to attract higher-value-added foreign investment and pro-
mote locally funded technological enterprises (DG529072014).
One oﬃcial explained, ‘‘We started to worry when we saw
other parts of China and other countries become more com-
petitive in producing manufactured goods. We saw that we
had lost our earlier advantage as many foreign investors
started moving to Suzhou. Companies were also complaining
that they couldnot ﬁnd suﬃciently skilled labor for manufac-
turing (DG629072014).” In response to these trends, Dong-
guan implemented a Singaporean-style ‘‘pioneering industrial
policy” with high-tech industrial zones (Yeung, 2001). To
reduce the burden of demand for energy, land, and labor, it
implemented the provincial government’s policy of ‘‘double
relocation” (shuangzhuanyi) by moving low-tech industries
and migrant workers to the inner regions of Guangdong
(DG1030072014; Po, 2008). This policy aimed to retain more
resources to develop high-tech production. However, eﬀorts to
attract foreign high-tech investment were not successful and
Dongguan’s industrial cluster planning remained far behind
that of Suzhou. Meanwhile, frustrated with local conditions,
foreign companies in Dongguan tended to move elsewhere in
China (DG1030072014). The general manager of a computer
manufacturer claimed that problems with public security and
bureaucracy caused the exodus of factories from Dongguan
to Suzhou and Kunshan (Poon, 2002). Corruption com-
pounded these problems (Yeung, 2001).
Although local oﬃcials recognized the need to develop
locally funded, high-tech companies, they acted too late and
the eﬀect of their policies was negligible. By prioritizing for-
eign investment to the de facto exclusion of other developmen-
tal strategies, the Dongguan government failed to actively
nurture local business innovation in the ﬁrst two decades of
reform. It was challenging to promote locally funded high-
tech enterprises in the short term given that Dongguan had
a weak base of human capital, coupled with a long history
of reliance on foreign companies instead of developing local
business. Without a pre-existing foundation of local busi-
nesses, Dongguan was less equipped to cope with the crisis.
Dongguan did reinvent itself as a local developmental state in
response to changes in the economic environment, but it was
not very successful and experienced the sharpest drops in
GDP and industrial output during the ﬁnancial crisis.
As in Wenzhou, the factors that initially enabled Dong-
guan’s economic success later became barriers in an appar-
ently path dependent manner. For example, its geographic
location between Shenzhen and Guangzhou attracted foreign
investment early on, but also led to environmental degrada-
tion due to lax environmental regulation and low-value-
added foreign enterprise. Yet local policies that proved ineﬀec-
tive at one point may not remain so in the future. The local
state still strives to attract foreign investment, but now aims
for high-tech foreign companies instead of low-value-added
processing and assembly works (DG730072014). Going for-
ward, Dongguan could consider other policy options, such
as taking more responsibility for the provision of social ser-
vices. Its leaders seem receptive. As one explained, ‘‘Although
we were hit hard by the 2008–09 crisis, I believe that we will be
more resilient in response to future obstacles as we have been
working on nurturing local talent, upgrading industries, and
trying to reduce reliance on foreign capital. There’s still time
for these policies to be implemented eﬀectively before the next
crisis (DG730072014).”
Table 4 summarizes the transformations in local state types
in the three localities from the 1980s to the 2000s.
Table 4. Local state adaptation in Suzhou, Wenzhou, and Dongguan
Locality 1980s 2000s Pattern of institutional adaptation
Suzhou Local developmental state:
– Strong state-led development,
e.g., supporting and then restruc-
turing TVEs;
– Establishment of the Suzhou
New District and the Suzhou
Industrial Park through a collab-
oration with Singapore;
– Providing favorable policies to
large companies, state-owned
companies, and enterprises with
foreign investment
Better performing local
developmental state:
– Actively strove to win over
central resources and opportuni-
ties;
– Introduction of research insti-
tutions such as Higher Education
Town to both attract external
talents and nurture local human
capital;
– Concentration on developing
high-tech industries to sustain
its competitive advantage
Proactive
Wenzhou Local liberal state:
– Tolerating early private
entrepreneurship and commerce;
– Indirect interventions in the
economy to facilitate market
activities;
– Allowing local informal ﬁnan-
cial institutions to serve private
businesses
Local developmental state:
– Inappropriate and ineﬀective
increased interventions in the
economy through oversight and
economic strategizing (e.g., failed
restructuring of family-based and
low-tech ﬁrms);
– Discrimination against smaller
businesses due to prioritizing
large-scale factories and ‘‘picking
winners” in particular sectors
Reactive
Dongguan Local entrepreneurial state:
– Close relationships between
local state and business at diﬀerent
local government levels through
deep and direct participation in
economic development, including
coalitions with foreign enter-
prises and providing favorable
conditions for foreign investors
Local developmental state:
– Implementation of a Singa-
porean-style ‘‘pioneer industrial
policy” with high-tech industrial
zones (e.g. relocation of low-tech
industries and migrant workers
to the inner regions of Guang-
dong);
– Attempt to attract high-tech
foreign companies;
– Cultivation of indigenous tal-
ents and innovative businesses;
establishment of industrial clus-
ters
Delayed
118 WORLD DEVELOPMENT7. FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO VARIATIONS
OF INSTITUTIONAL ADAPTABILITY IN SUZHOU,
WENZHOU AND DONGGUAN
Although structural factors inﬂuenced the opportunities
available to the local state, the agent-centric factors of local
leadership, trying new developmental ideas, and state capacity
are pivotal in explaining variation in institutional adaptability
among Suzhou, Wenzhou, and Dongguan. Whether localities
could continuously adapt to changing economic contexts over
the past three decades yielded diﬀerent levels of crisis-coping
abilities that were apparent prior to the global ﬁnancial crisis.
At the outset of reform, Suzhou and Dongguan leveraged
their strategic geographical locations and abundant natural
resources to become hubs for both trade and political atten-
tion. By contrast, Wenzhou’s lack of natural endowments
and geographic limitations contributed to its indigenous pat-
tern of petty commodity production based on family busi-
nesses. In the absence of strong leadership with the
motivation and capacity to recognize the temporal limits of
the initial Wenzhou model, familiar patterns of production
generated ‘‘intergenerational lock-in” (Shi, 2004). Even asother regional economies of China had developed labor-
intensive manufacturing or moved to more knowledge-
intensive sectors, Wenzhou’s ﬁrms continued to rely on shared
local knowledge, commercial and cultural backgrounds, trans-
action modes, and market networks. Wenzhou’s businesses
lagged in adopting new technology and lacked the knowhow
to undertake basic research (Brusco, 1992). The once-
thriving kinship enterprises later revealed serious problems
with property rights, and were soon challenged by more com-
petitive ﬁrms elsewhere in China (WZ219122014). Dongguan’s
location attracted ethnic Chinese foreign investors from Hong
Kong and Taiwan. By prioritizing FDI-led growth, however,
the local state did not thwart environmental degradation or
nurture indigenous businesses, which limited its capacity for
institutional adaptability in subsequent decades.
Meanwhile, Suzhou beneﬁted from central government
assistance and high-proﬁle collaborations with foreign part-
ners to a greater extent than in Wenzhou and Dongguan. As
a prefectural-level city, Wenzhou lacked access to national-
level investment in higher education and research facilities,
which limited chances for interaction with foreign experts
(Liu, 2011). Although Wenzhou’s entrepreneurs traveled
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vative business projects to Wenzhou. Local businesses thus
lacked opportunities to learn advanced technological and
management skills. While Dongguan was an early beneﬁciary
of China’s opening to foreign capital, its economy became
trapped in a low-value-added production system, and local
leaders realized only belatedly the importance of nurturing
its own experts and attracting overseas talent. Dongguan’s
reliance on unskilled rural migrants in low-end processing
and assembly made it more diﬃcult to develop locally funded
high-tech industries later on. 3
Finally, while Wenzhou and Dongguan both suﬀered from
long-standing challenges in mobilizing ﬁscal revenues (Liu,
2011), Suzhou had well-funded public coﬀers. In this sense,
the structural condition of ﬁscal resources aﬀected the
agent-centric factor of local state capacity. Suzhou’s develop-
mental trajectory was strongly led by a local state equipped
with ﬁscal revenues. Unlike Wenzhou’s bootstrapping house-
hold enterprises that operated in rural areas independent of
local state support, Suzhou’s indigenous businesses had clo-
ser relationships with the local state (SZ815102014). As a
cadre from the Industrial and Commercial Management
Bureau explained, ‘‘It is easier to collect tax revenues from
a concentrated number of large enterprises with ties to the
local state than from thousands of scattered, small private
businesses (SZ815102014).” Although decentralizing reforms
in China’s ﬁscal system incentivized local economic growth
(Montinola, Yingyi, & Weingast, 1995; Oi, 1992; Shirk,
1993), in the long run this decentralization put Wenzhou’s
local state in a more diﬃcult position. The central govern-
ment required it to collect its own revenues, yet Wenzhou’s
entrepreneurs complained about harassment by tax collectors
and coerced ‘‘donations” (WZ219122014). To attract foreign
investment, Dongguan’s local state invested substantially in
hard infrastructure early on. These capital-intensive projects
were ﬁnanced from three sources: (i) an infrastructure devel-
opment fund established through government treasury funds,
budgetary funds, bank loans, and public donations; (ii) rev-
enue generated by township and village governments through
toll roads, rental income, etc.; and (iii) the proﬁts of SOEs
(Ye, 1994). This strategy enabled the municipal government
to reduce its ﬁnancial dependence on the provincial govern-
ment, and also decreased its ﬁscal responsibilities by relying
on township and village governments and public donations
(Yeung, 2001). However, problems emerged when the econ-
omy cooled, incomes declined, and township and village gov-
ernments incurred debt, especially during the global ﬁnancial
crisis (DG830072014). For instance, rental income, an impor-
tant source of revenue for township and village governments,
declined rapidly due to the collapse of factories and a
decrease in the number of migrant workers (Xue & Wu,
2015). The municipal government thus faced ﬁscal con-
straints in pursuing new projects. With suﬃcient revenue,
the local state had more resources to build infrastructure
and provide public goods to establish a favorable business
environment, and vice versa.
While the structural factors discussed above present eco-
nomic options, ultimately, an agent-centric perspective pro-
vides greater explanatory leverage for explaining the
localities’ varying levels of institutional adaptability. Local
leadership, openness to new policy ideas, and state capacity
can make all the diﬀerence in allocating available resources
for local development. Geographical location and endow-
ments alone cannot explain institutional adaptability. Agents
need to decide what to do with those inheritances, and whether
to redeploy them for alternative purposes. Entrepreneurialpolitical actors can also mobilize new resources (e.g., from
higher levels of government, foreign investors, diasporic net-
works, and so on). Local state capacity for policy implementa-
tion is key for realizing these alternative visions for
development.
(a) Motivated and capable leadership
Unlike Wenzhou and Dongguan, Suzhou has a distin-
guished history of well-educated and competent leaders—
which in the Chinese context, is regarded as high leadership
‘‘quality” (suzhi). We collected information on top leaders’
educational backgrounds, and can conﬁrm that this trend
has continued. As shown in Appendix B, Suzhou top leaders
have much stronger educational backgrounds (5/14 have
bachelor degrees, 2/14 have master degrees and 5/14 have
PhDs) than Wenzhou (3/14 have bachelor degrees, 1/14 has
a master degree and 1/14 has a PhD) and Dongguan (2/7 have
bachelor degrees, 2/7 have master degrees and 2/7 have PhD
degrees), which may play an important role in their policy
making processes. Overall, Suzhou’s party secretaries and
mayors have higher levels of educational attainment, are
assigned to Suzhou from other parts of the country, and are
more likely to be promoted than counterparts in Wenzhou
and Dongguan.
The native origin of leaders has also been identiﬁed as a fac-
tor that impacts decision-making (Zang, 1991) because locals
are expected to be more sympathetic to their native region’s
traditional or preferred mode of economic development.
Based on this logic, a region with more non-local oﬃcials is
more likely to have political entrepreneurs that are motivated
to impress higher levels of government by making a mark on
the local economy during their tenures. Conversely, a region
with more local leaders may be less motivated to experiment
with alternative economic strategies. We found that Dong-
guan has the highest ratio of locals among its top leaders (3
out of 8), while Suzhou (1 out of 15) has the smallest number
of locals during its reform period. This helps to explain
Suzhou’s long-standing compliance with Beijing’s instructions,
as scholars have suggested that oﬃcials who believe they have
a better chance of being promoted exhibit greater motivation
and entrepreneurialism during their tour of duty
(Donaldson, 2009). More top leaders in Suzhou have achieved
Level 1 positions in their future careers (4 out of 13 in Suzhou,
3 out of 13 in Wenzhou, and 0 out of 7 in Dongguan). 4
Suzhou’s far-sighted policy decisions and competent leadership
base was further reinforced by its interactions with Singapore.
The sustained relationship between Singaporean companies
and Suzhou’s government oﬃcials brought enormous beneﬁts
in the form of exposure to modern management techniques,
participation in holistic planning processes, and an expanded
horizon in choosing developmental strategies. These skills
were honed through intimate long-term interaction at a high
level involving both foreign investors and local leaders at every
step of planning and decision-making.
(b) Openness to new ideas
Suzhou’s leaders demonstrated openness to new policy ideas
at vital turning points. The ﬁrst was the restructuring of TVEs
into collectively owned enterprises and later into privately
owned enterprises to overcome problems associated with
unclear property rights (SZ1124062014). The second turning
point occurred after several years of local processing for multi-
national corporations, when the local state realized the impor-
tance of cultivating local innovation and talent.
Table 5. Variation in Crisis-Coping Ability in Suzhou, Wenzhou, and Dongguan
Locality Structural context Agent-centric factors aﬀecting
institutional adaptability
Institutional adaptability Crisis-coping ability and
economic performance
Suzhou Good geographical and historical
conditions; Substantial
opportunity of foreign
cooperation; Good ﬁscal health
Well educated and competent
leadership, non-local leaders with
high promotion prospects; Far-
sighted policies; Good
administrative eﬃciency and
government transparency
Strong Good
Wenzhou Poor geographical situation and
lack of natural resources; Lack of
opportunity for foreign
cooperation; Poor ﬁscal
conditions
Less educated and competent
leadership, and less likely to be
promoted; Inappropriate
policies; Poor administrative
eﬃciency and government
transparency
Weak Poor
Dongguan Good geographical conditions
and rich natural endowments
(poorly maintained later); Low-
end manufacturing with foreign
companies; Over-decentralized
ﬁscal arrangements
Less educated and competent
leadership, more local leaders,
and less likely to be promoted;
Good policies applied too late;
Poor administrative eﬃciency
and government transparency
Weak Poor
120 WORLD DEVELOPMENTUnlike Suzhou, the static character of Wenzhou local oﬃ-
cials’ developmental views can be attributed to the lower
degree of collaboration with foreign governments and foreign
investors. Although Wenzhou had ample foreign exposure
through its commercial diaspora, its FDI was dispersed and
low-tech, and few foreigners opted to work and live in Wen-
zhou. Their oﬃcials thus had fewer opportunities to learn
about modern industrial organization and strategic planning
from more developed countries. Combined with parochial
pride in the distinctive merits of the Wenzhou model, this
lacuna limited the receptiveness of local leaders to select devel-
opmental strategies compatible with changing market condi-
tions. For instance, despite a lack of R&D resources and
FDI, few preferential policies were introduced to attract over-
seas professionals or foreign investment.
In a similar vein, the policy preferences of Dongguan’s high-
level leadership were circumscribed due to relative insulation
from new ideas. Without Suzhou’s high-level foreign collabo-
ration, Dongguan’s overseas Chinese investment during the
reform era was mostly in low-end manufacturing, providing
fewer chances to learn developmental strategies from
advanced foreign companies. This aﬀected their future
decision-making. During later stages of reform, Dongguan’s
local state ultimately realized the necessity of promoting both
foreign and local high-tech industries. However, they lacked
judgment about the appropriate moment to implement this
transformation. It was more challenging to attract high-tech
foreign ﬁrms once other municipalities had surpassed Dong-
guan in terms of hard and soft infrastructure. Similarly, it
was diﬃcult to develop locally funded high-tech ﬁrms in the
absence of prior eﬀorts to cultivate experts and learn advanced
management and technical skills.
(c) Local state capacity
As a local developmental state, Suzhou was more eﬃcient in
policy implementation than Wenzhou and Dongguan, which
enabled Suzhou to retain and enhance its earlier developmen-
tal advantages. Suzhou’s local state enacted policies to attract
and nurture talent, and was proactive in securing resources
from the central government. Its eﬀorts included the successful
establishment of a nanotechnology industry, which was facili-
tated by maintaining good communications with the centralgovernment (Cao, 2014). When the Chinese Academy of
Sciences ﬁnally agreed to set up the Suzhou Institute of
Nano-Tech and Nano-Bionics (SINANO) after lengthy per-
suasion by Suzhou in 2006, Suzhou’s local state provided full
support (Cao, 2014). When China’s Ministry of Science and
Technology (MoST) collaborated with the Finnish Funding
Agency for Innovation to launch nanotechnology develop-
ment in 2007, MoST nominated Suzhou for the National
Nano-Tech International Innovation Park (Cao, 2014).
Through such proactive eﬀorts at advancement, Suzhou
earned a reputation for innovative business projects.
Wenzhou’s local liberal state was less eﬀective in policy
implementation. Improvements in government transparency
and administrative eﬃciency were sluggish. Businesses com-
plained that Wenzhou’s government merely ‘‘shouted slo-
gans,” but failed to develop tertiary education and research
(WZ502072014). Black-box transactions and rent-seeking
activities were revealed through the tearing down of the tallest
‘‘corrupt building” in Zhejiang (Wei et al., 2007). Some oﬃ-
cials helped businesses obtain land, electricity, bank loans,
and state projects, and reduced their taxes and administrative
fees illegally in exchange for personal beneﬁts.
Similar to Wenzhou, Dongguan lacked administrative trans-
parency and eﬃciency in implementing policy. Their ﬂexible
bureaucracy provided fertile ground for rent-seeking activities
by local oﬃcials (Yeung, 2001). Exacerbated by lax enforce-
ment of laws and regulations, illegal miscellaneous charges
not only increased transaction costs for foreign investors,
but also gave the impression that local oﬃcials were abusing
their power (Yeung, 2001). This deepened the determination
of foreign capital, including ﬁrms owned by ethnic Chinese,
to relocate to areas with more transparent administrative gov-
ernance.8. CONCLUSION
Drawing on national census data, local statistical data, and
in-depth ﬁeld interviews, this paper examined the Suzhou,
Wenzhou, and Dongguan models to explain why previously
well-developed economic models varied in economic perfor-
mance, adaptive governance, and capacity to withstand the
global economic downturn of the late 2000s. We propose that
INSTITUTIONAL ADAPTABILITY IN CHINA 121variation in the institutional adaptability of local states
throughout the course of their developmental experiences
had a deﬁning eﬀect on how these cities fared under crisis. Fac-
tors accounting for their variation in institutional adaptability
were inﬂuenced by structural conditions, but ultimately, agent-
centric factors involving local state leadership capacity were
key in determining whether a locality was able to redirect its
developmental trajectory prior to an economic shock. This
paper sheds light on the extent of adaptive adjustment to
altered circumstances in the service of continuous reproduc-
tion of existing systems, and shifts the focus on state capacity
for adaptation from the national to the sub-national level in
China. Table 5 summarizes the causal mechanisms that led
to variation in the crisis-coping ability and economic perfor-
mance of the three cities.
Suzhou possessed stronger institutional adaptability than
did Wenzhou and Dongguan, which we conceptualize as the
extent to which local state transformation matched the chang-
ing economic circumstances at opportune turning points. We
identify Suzhou’s adaptive governance as proactive because it
successfully sustained its competitive advantage by acting as
a local development state that adapted to the dynamic eco-
nomic environment over multiple phases. Wenzhou and
Dongguan developed along diﬀerent trajectories. To be sure,
both achieved remarkable economic growth, but their local
states revealed weak crisis-coping abilities and declining eco-
nomic performance during the ﬁnancial crisis, albeit for diﬀer-
ent reasons. Wenzhou’s local liberal state displayed reactive
adaptive governance. It played an eﬀective role at the beginning
of reform by allowing private enterprise to serve as the growth
engine of its economy, well before other parts of China. How-
ever, Wenzhou’s attempted transformation into a local devel-
opmental state failed when the economic environment
changed, as inappropriate interventionist measures resulted
in weak crisis-coping ability during the global ﬁnancial crisis.
Despite success as a local entrepreneurial state during the ﬁrst
two decades of the reform era, Dongguan also exhibited lim-
ited institutional adaptability in response to the dynamic eco-
nomic environment by transforming too late into a local
developmental state. Therefore, we identify Dongguan as an
example of delayed adaptive governance.
Agent-centric factors mediated structural factors in shaping
the institutional adaptability of the three local states. While a
certain degree of path dependency aﬀected the options for
change, agent-centric factors were critical in the formulation
of local state responses. Structurally, Suzhou, Wenzhou, and
Dongguan were all aﬀected by their natural endowments and
historical legacies; external resources and opportunities; and fis-
cal conditions. First, geographical conditions and natural
endowments provided Suzhou with opportunities and
resources, but decreased Wenzhou’s attractiveness to foreign
investment and external talent; and obstructed its transforma-
tion from family-based to modern corporations. Dongguan’s
location was conducive to foreign investment, but the latter
was accompanied by an inﬂux of low-skilled migrants and
environmental degradation. Second, diﬀerential exposure to
international inﬂuences brought economic beneﬁts and man-
agement skills to Suzhou, but limited Wenzhou’s exposure
to foreign interaction and trapped Dongguan in low-tech pro-
duction. Third, long-term ﬁscal conditions resulting partly
from past developmental patterns facilitated Suzhou’s trans-
formation, but restrained Wenzhou’s adaptive capacity and
adversely aﬀected Dongguan’s future development.
More importantly, however, from an agent-centric perspec-
tive, the combination of highly motivated and capable leader-
ship, openness to new policy ideas, and local state capacity forpolicy implementation fundamentally aﬀected local institu-
tional adaptability. Above all, Suzhou’s leadership base was
more highly motivated, better educated, and more competent
than in Wenzhou and Dongguan. A long-term partnership
with Singapore brought spillover beneﬁts that shaped the
developmental views of local oﬃcials, steering them toward
more innovative policies. Finally, compared with the lack of
bureaucratic transparency and ineﬃciency in Wenzhou and
Dongguan’s administrative apparatus, Suzhou’s local state
consistently demonstrated capacity to implement policies
eﬀectively.
Although structural conditions provided each of the locali-
ties with certain opportunities at the outset of the reform
era, in the end, capable leadership was instrumental in leverag-
ing those beneﬁts and making policy adjustments as economic
conditions changed. A broader observation is that under
dynamic market conditions, factors that promote economic
success at one point can become barriers later on. Although
we refrain from judging the future performance of particular
developmental patterns, exploring a region’s institutional
adaptability and analyzing factors that account for this pro-
vides a more nuanced means for understanding the dynamics
of a region’s evolving developmental patterns and perfor-
mance—during normal times, as well as more challenging peri-
ods.
Going forward, these insights have potential implications
for the institutional adaptability of localities in western and
central provinces. To be sure, they face diﬀerent structural
conditions, including the absence of some of the geographic
and infrastructural advantages of the three eastern localities
discussed in this paper. Localities in China’s central and
northeastern rustbelts have also grappled with the challenges
of state sector restructuring and accompanying social disloca-
tions. Nonetheless, our ﬁndings suggest that agent-centric fac-
tors can enhance or inhibit the institutional adaptability of
these areas. Indeed, China’s party-state recognizes that
appointing highly capable, politically promising cadres to
inland provinces can serve as a testing ground for their ability
to devise and implement new developmental strategies. 5 Sim-
ilar dynamics can be observed at the sub-provincial level.
Within Sichuan, for example, under the leadership of ambi-
tious local oﬃcials, Chengdu’s growth rate surpassed that of
Chongqing during the 1990s even though Beijing had a vested
interest in Chongqing’s strategically important position
(Hong, 1999). Despite having limited resources at their dis-
posal, Chengdu’s leaders exerted greater autonomy in tailor-
ing national policies to suit local conditions. Further
comparative research focusing on the expressions of local state
agency in west and central China would yield additional
insights about the possibilities of institutional adaptability
under structural conditions that are apparently more con-
strained for market-oriented development.
From a policy perspective, the mixed experiences of Suzhou,
Wenzhou, and Dongguan hold lessons for politically moti-
vated leaders appointed to western, central, and northeastern
localities. As Guangdong relocates pollution-producing facto-
ries to less-developed areas such as Anhui, northern Jiangsu,
and western Shandong (Zhu, He, & Liu, 2014), receiving
inland localities should negotiate terms for environmental
and labor protection given that Dongguan neglected to do
so with ethnic Chinese FDI. By contrast, Suzhou’s assertive
engagement with the central government and foreign capital
succeeded in fostering an ecosystem that supports innovation
and attracts skilled labor. In geographically insulated areas
such as Wenzhou that are less attractive to foreign investment
and talent, local states can still formulate creative solutions to
122 WORLD DEVELOPMENTrepurpose existing resources and develop new opportunities.
Wenzhou’s Association of Overseas Chinese Aﬀairs, for exam-
ple, recently launched an initiative to engage its diasporic sci-
entists, professionals, and engineers to advise the locality on
upgrading its health care, higher education, and business
development institutions (WZ1910816). These are just a few
examples of the types of strategies that inland localities could
pursue.
Since the commencement of liberalizing reforms in the late
1970s, China’s economic topography has shifted in an
unexpectedly redistributive and uneven manner. Socialist-erabeneﬁciaries of state industrial investment have lagged behind
eastern localities that were neglected during the Mao era, but
subsequently developed vibrant market economies due to local
political and economic entrepreneurship. Within the latter
category, Suzhou, Wenzhou, and Dongguan charted three
diﬀerent developmental ‘‘models” that ﬂourished for decades,
but then diverged in their institutional adaptability under
changing market conditions. The capacity of their respective
leaders to recognize and respond proactively to evolving chal-
lenges proved to be critical before a major economic shock
forced the issue.NOTES1. Following Oi (1992), this paper refers to local governments as ‘‘local
states” to capture the set of sub-national political and economic
institutions that exercise administrative authority over a given territory.
2. Note that Bo Xilai became acting mayor of Dalian in 1992 and mayor
in 1993. As party secretary of Chongqing (2007–12), Bo Xilai attracted
national attention for his revival of Mao-era principles, policies, and
cultural symbols. He was subsequently charged with corruption, expelled
from the Communist Party, and sentenced to life imprisonment.
3. Chen (2014) reached an opposite conclusion from conducting a
comparison study between Shenzhen and Suzhou, arguing that local
governments allied with large multinational corporations at the top of the
value chain squeezed domestic ﬁrms to the bottom of the value chain whilealliances with small foreign invested ﬁrms at the bottom facilitated local
learning and innovation.
4. Level 1 refers to leading roles of ministries or equivalents, or of
provinces or equivalents; Level 2 refers to assisting roles of ministries or
equivalents, or of provinces or equivalents; and Level 3 refers to leading
roles of departments or equivalents, or of prefectures or equivalents. The
positions of Party secretaries and mayors in Suzhou, Wenzhou, and
Dongguan are all Level 3.
5. For example, China’s current Premier, Li Keqiang, served as
Governor of Henan province (1998–2004) in central China and Party
Secretary of Liaoning province (2004–07) prior to his appointment on the
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APPENDIX A. INTERVIEWS
Interview Number Interview Location Interview Date Interviewee
SZ113102014 Suzhou, Jiangsu 13/10/2014 Vice director of the ﬁnance
department at Company A
SZ213102014 Suzhou, Jiangsu 13/10/2014 Vice president at Company B
SZ313102014 Suzhou, Jiangsu 13/10/2014 Director of overseas
department at Company C
SZ414102014 Suzhou, Jiangsu 14/10/2014 General manager at Company
D
SZ514102014 Suzhou, Jiangsu 14/10/2014 Vice president at Company E
SZ615102014 Suzhou, Jiangsu 15/10/2014 General manager at Company
F
SZ715102014 Suzhou, Jiangsu 15/10/2014 Vice president at Company G
SZ815102014 Suzhou, Jiangsu 15/10/2014 Local oﬃcial A at the
Industrial & Commercial
Management Bureau
SZ915102014 Suzhou, Jiangsu 15/10/2014 Local oﬃcial B at the Industrial
& Commercial Management
Bureau
SZ1024062014 Suzhou, Jiangsu 15/10/2014 Local oﬃcial C at the
Industrial & Commercial
Management Bureau
SZ1124062014 Suzhou, Jiangsu 15/10/2014 Local oﬃcial D at the
Development and Reform
Bureau
DG128072014 Dongguan, Guangdong 28/07/2014 Vice president at Company A
DG228072014 Dongguan, Guangdong 28/07/2014 Director of ﬁnance department
at Company B
DG328072014 Dongguan, Guangdong 28/07/2014 General manager at Company
C
DG429072014 Dongguan, Guangdong 29/07/2014 General manager at Company
D
DG529072014 Dongguan, Guangdong 29/07/2014 General manager at Company
E
DG629072014 Dongguan, Guangdong 29/07/2014 Local Oﬃcial A at the
Development and Reform
Bureau
DG730072014 Dongguan, Guangdong 30/07/2014 Local Oﬃcial B at the
Development and Reform
Bureau
DG830072014 Dongguan, Guangdong 30/07/2014 Local Oﬃcial C at the
Economy and Information
Technology Bureau
DG930072014 Dongguan, Guangdong 30/07/2014 Local Oﬃcial D at the
Economy and Information
Technology Bureau
DG1030072014 Dongguan, Guangdong 30/07/2014 Local Oﬃcial E at the Statistics
Bureau
WZ119122014 Wenzhou, Zhejiang 19/12/2014 Vice president at Company A
WZ219122014 Wenzhou, Zhejiang 19/12/2014 General manager at Company
B
WZ319122014 Wenzhou, Zhejiang 19/12/2014 Director of ﬁnance department
at Company C
WZ419122014 Wenzhou, Zhejiang 19/12/2014 General manager at Company
D
WZ502072014 Huzhou, Zhejiang 02/07/2014 General manager at Company
E
WZ602072014 Huzhou, Zhejiang 02/07/2014 Vice president at Company F
WZ718122014 Wenzhou, Zhejiang 18/12/2014 Local oﬃcial A at the
Development and Reform
Bureau
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APPENDIX A (continued)
Interview Number Interview Location Interview Date Interviewee
WZ818122014 Wenzhou, Zhejiang 18/12/2014 Local oﬃcial B at the
Development and Reform
Bureau
WZ918122014 Wenzhou, Zhejiang 18/12/2014 Local oﬃcial C at the
Development and Reform
Bureau
WZ1018122014 Wenzhou, Zhejiang 18/12/2014 Local oﬃcial D at the
Economy and Information
Technology Bureau
CN114132014 Cangnan County, Wenzhou, Zhejiang 13/4/2014 Local oﬃcial of the
Construction Bureau,
provincial CCP, and director of
a business association
YW14142014 Yiwu County, Zhejiang 14/4/2014 Private entrepreneur and vice
director of a business
association
WZ24152014 Wenzhou, Zhejiang 15/4/2014 Manager at a state-owned
commercial bank
WZ1910816 Wenzhou, Zhejiang 8/1/2016 Chairperson, Wenzhou
Association of Overseas
Chinese Aﬀairs
APPENDIX B. PROFILES OF PARTY SECRETARIES AND MAYORS IN SUZHOU, WENZHOU AND DONGGUAN
Suzhou party secretaries Time period in position Career prospects
(highest position
level achieved)
Local? Educational
background
高德正
Gao Dezheng
1987–89 From Level 3 to
2
No Associate Degree
王敏生
Wang Mingsheng
1989–94 From Level 3 to
2
No II*
杨晓堂
Yang Xiaotang
1994–98 From Level 3 to
1
No Bachelor Degree
梁保华
Liang Baohua
1998–2000 From Level 3 to
2
No Bachelor Degree
陈德铭
Chen Deming
2000–02 From Level 3 to
1
No PhD
王珉
Wang Min
2002–04 From Level 3 to
1
No PhD, Professor
王荣
Wang Rong
2004–09 From Level 3 to
1
No PhD, Professor
蒋宏坤
Jiang Hongkun
2009–14 From Level 3 to
2
Yes Associate Degree
石泰峰
Shi Taifeng
2014–present NA** No PhD, Professor
Suzhou Mayors Time Period in Position Career Prospects
(highest position
level achieved)
Local? Educational
Background
段绪申
Duan Xushen
1984–86 From Level 3 to
2
No Bachelor Degree
俞兴德
Yu Xingde
1986–89 From Level 3 to
2
No Bachelor Degree
章新胜
Zhang Xinsheng
1989–97 From Level 3 to
2
No Master Degree
(continued on next page)
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APPENDIX B (continued)
Suzhou Mayors Time Period in Position Career Prospects
(highest position
level achieved)
Local? Educational
Background
陈德铭
Chen Deming
1997–2000 From Level 3 to
1
No PhD
杨卫泽
Yang Weize
2001–04 From Level 3 to
2(corruption)
No Master Degree
阎立
Yan Li
2004–12 From Level 3 to
3
No PhD
周乃翔
Zhou Naixiang
2012–present NA** No Bachelor Degree
Wenzhou Party Secretaries Time Period in Position Career Prospects
(highest position
level achieved)
Local? Educational
Background
董朝才
Dong Zhaocai
1985–90 II* No II*
刘锡荣
Liu Xirong
1990–91 From Level 3 to
2
No Bachelor Degree
孔祥有
Kong Xiangyou
1991–93 From Level 3 to
2
No Technical
Secondary
School
张友余
Zhang Youyu
1993–98 From Level 3 to
2
No Technical
Secondary
School
蒋巨峰
Jiang Jufeng
1998–2002 From Level 3 to
1
No Bachelor Degree
李强
Li Qiang
2002–04 From Level 3 to
1
Yes Master Degree
from Party
School of CCP
王建满
Wang Jianman
2004–08 From Level 3 to
2
No Master Degree
from Party
School of CCP
邵占维
Shao Zhanwei
2008–10 From Level 3 to
2
No Bachelor Degree
from Party
School of CCP
陈德荣
Chen Derong
2010–13 From Level 3 to
1
Yes Master Degree
陈一新
Chen Yixin
2013–present NA Yes Master Degree
from Party
School of CCP
Wenzhou Mayors Time Period in Position Career Prospects
(highest position
level achieved)
Local? Educational
Background
卢声亮
Lu Shengliang
1983–88 From Level 3 to
3
Yes Associate Degree
刘锡荣
Liu Xirong
1988–90 From Level 3 to
2
No Bachelor Degree
陈文宪
Chen Wenxian
1990–96 From Level 3 to
3 (corruption)
II* II*
钱兴中
Qian Xingzhong
1996–2003 II* No Associate Degree
刘奇
Liu Qi
2003–06 From Level 3 to
2
No PhD
邵占维
Shao Zhanwei
2006–08 From Level 3 to
2
No Bachelor Degree
from Party
School of CCP
赵一德
Zhao Yide
2008–11 From Level 3 to
2
No Master Degree
from Party
School of CCP
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Wenzhou Mayors Time Period in Position Career Prospects
(highest position
level achieved)
Local? Educational
Background
陈金彪
Chen Jinbiao
2011–15 From Level 3 to
3
No Master Degree
from Party
School of CCP
徐立毅
Xu Liyi
Candidate NA** No Bachelor Degree
Dongguan Party Secretaries Time Period in Position Career Prospects
(highest position
level achieved)
Local? Educational
Background
欧阳德
Ou Yangde
1988–94 From Level 3 to
2
II* II*
李近维
Li Jinwei
1994–2001 From Level 3 to
2
Yes Associate Degree
佟星
Tong Xing
2001–06 From Level 3 to
2
No Bachelor Degree
刘志庚
Liu Zhigeng
2006–11 From Level 3 to
2
No PhD
徐建华
Xu Jianhua
2011–present NA** No Bachelor Degree
Dongguan Mayors Time Period in Position Career Prospects
(highest position
level achieved)
Local? Educational
Background
叶耀
Ye Yao
1991–94 From Level 3 to
3
Yes II*
李近维
Li Jinwei
1994–97 From Level 3 to
2
Yes Associate Degree
佟星
Tong Xing
1997–2001 From Level 3 to
2
No Bachelor Degree
黎桂康
Li Guikang
2001–04 From Level 3 to
2
Yes Master Degree
刘志庚
Liu Zhigeng
2004–06 From Level 3 to
2
No PhD
李毓全
Li Yuquan
2006–11 From Level 3 to
2
No PhD
袁宝成
Yuan Baocheng
2011–present NA** No Master Degree
Sources: Biographical information taken from http://www.baidu.baike.com.cn.
Note: II*: insuﬃcient information, NA**: not applicable.
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